Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) .
Introduction
Araujo et al. (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraints or transversality condition, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in economies where collateral is the only mechanism that enforces agents to pay their debts. The intuition behind their result is as follows. Combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral constitutes a joint operation that yields non-negative returns. By non-arbitrage, at equilibrium, the price of the collateral exceeds the price of the asset, implying that collateral costs exceed the value of loans. Therefore, it becomes impossible to pay a previous debt by issuing new debt. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples of collateralized economies in which they claim that the introduction of default penalties may induce payments besides the value of the collateral and lead to the reappearance of Ponzi schemes. The intuition is as follows. When penalties are severe enough, agents have incentives to pay more than the value of the depreciated collateral. In this case, the joint operation of combining short sales with the purchase of collateral may no longer yield non-negative returns. Therefore, loans may exceed collateral costs and the possibility of running a Ponzi scheme may reappear. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) also claimed that collateral still avoids Ponzi schemes provided that default penalties are moderate, in the sense that, for infinitely many periods, the penalty associated with the maximal default for a physically feasible plan is less than the utility from consuming the current endowment. Their claim appears to be intuitive. If default penalties are moderate, then default does not hurt much since the utility from consuming the current endowment always compensates the disutility suffered from defaulting. Therefore, moderate default penalties do not induce payments besides the value of the collateral, implying that collateral costs exceed loans. This is sufficient to preclude Ponzi schemes.
This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . We show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . Choosing appropriately the primitives in those two examples we prove that no trade is a possible equilibrium outcome. This is due to the fact that the standard equilibrium concept leaves room for spurious inactivity on asset markets due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. In the definition of a competitive equilibrium, the market clearing equation defining the delivery rate expected by lenders leaves its value undeterminate when there is no trade at equilibrium. A similar issue was already pointed out by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) . However, in their model it is easy to support equilibria with no trade in the asset markets on account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. Indeed, if lenders expect assets to deliver nothing, then we can support any pure-spot equilibria by choosing the asset prices to be equal to zero. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) claimed that this problem does not arise anymore in the presence of collateral requirements since lenders rationally expect deliveries to be at least larger than the minimum between the promise and the value of the depreciated collateral. It is true that we cannot support pure-spot equilibria in a trivial manner as it is the case in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) . However, spurious inactivity on asset markets due to overpessimistic expectations is still a problem even in the presence of collateral requirements. We clarify this issue and exhibit explicitly the prices that support no trade in the two examples proposed in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) .
Given this finding it is clear that we have to refine the equilibrium concept in order to rule out equilibria where inactivity in asset markets is due to irrationally pessimistic expectations. We propose to adapt the refined equilibrium concept introduced by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) to collateralized economies. It is then natural to investigate whether Ponzi schemes reappear when default penalties are harsh and overpessimistic expectations are ruled out. Actually, we go further by showing that a refined equilibrium may not exist even if default penalties are moderate.
3 More precisely, we provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties that are severe enough to induce agents to pay fully their debt at every period. Choosing asset promises greater than the depreciated collateral bundles implies that the joint operation combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral yields negative returns. 4 We show that we can suitably choose preference relations and collateral bundles such that the negative returns of the joint operation are not compensated by the utility of "consuming" the collateral. Therefore, asset prices must exceed the price of collateral and agents are induced to run a Ponzi scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a simplified version of the model proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) and define the associated equilibrium concept. In section 3 we show that in both examples found in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) no trade due to pessimistic expectations is a possible equilibrium outcome. In the spirit of Dubey et al. (2005) , we define in Section 4 a refined equilibrium concept to rule out unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. In Section 5 we construct an example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which agents are induced to run Ponzi schemes and a refined equilibrium fails to exist. Appendix A contains a transversality condition result that is used in Section 3. In Appendix B we propose a sufficient condition on penalties that rules out Ponzi schemes and we provide a sketch of the proof of the corresponding existence result.
The Model
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) considered an extension of the model developed by Araujo et al. (2002) to allow for the possibility of linear default penalties. Since our objective is to provide a counter-example to both the non-existence and existence results presented in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) , we consider a specific and simple infinite horizon economy E without uncertainty and with one short-lived asset. The set {0, 1, . . . , t, . . .} of time periods is denoted by T .
Agents and commodities
There exists a finite set L of commodities available for trade at every period. We interpret x t ∈ R L + as a claim to consumption at period t. We also write 1 { } ∈ R L + 3 In that respect, we provide a "counter-example" to the existence result claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . Indeed, if the arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) were correct, then we would get existence of a refined equilibrium when default penalties are moderate.
4 This is not true for equilibria that are not refined since agents may expect the asset to deliver nothing above the depreciated value of the collateral, despite the fact that default penalties would induce agents to repay fully their debt in case of trade.
for the commodity bundle consisting of one unit of commodity ∈ L and nothing else. We allow for some commodities to be non-perishable, that is, we allow for storable and durable goods. Transformation of commodities is represented by a family (
represents what is obtained at period t 1 if the bundle z t−1 ∈ R L + is purchased at period t − 1. At each period there are spot markets for trading every commodity. We let p = (p t ) t∈T denote the sequence of spot prices where p t = (p t ( )) ∈L ∈ R L + is the price vector at period t. There is a finite set I of infinitely lived agents. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by an endowment sequence
+ denotes the endowment bundle available at period t. Each agent chooses a consumption sequence x = (x t ) t∈T where x t ∈ R L + . We denote by X the set of consumption sequences. The utility function U i : X −→ [0, +∞] is assumed to be time-additively separable, i.e.,
represents the instantaneous utility function at period t and β i ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Assets and collateral
There is a single asset which is a short-lived real security available for trade at each period t, paying the dividend p t+1 A t+1 that corresponds to the value of a bundle A t+1 ∈ R L + under the spot price vector p t+1 . We let q = (q t ) t∈T be the asset price sequence where q t ∈ R + represents the asset price at period t. For each agent i, we denote by θ i t ∈ R + the purchases and by ϕ i t ∈ R + the short-sales of the asset at each period t. The asset is collateralized in the sense that for every unit of asset sold at a period t, agents should buy a collateral C t ∈ R L + that protects lenders in case of default. Implicitly we assume that payments can be enforced through the seizure of the collateral. At a period t 1, agent i should deliver the promise V t (p)ϕ i t−1 where V t (p) = p t A t . However, agent i may decide to default and choose a delivery d 
Following Dubey et al. (2005) , Páscoa and Seghir (2009) assume that each agent i feels at period t a disutility from defaulting which is represented by a linear function of the extent of default. More precisely, if agent i decides to deliver d i t at period t given promises ϕ i t−1 made at t − 1, then he suffers at the initial date, the disutility
where µ i t ∈ [0, ∞] and p t w t is the market value of an exogenously given bundle w t . 5 In that case, agent i may have an incentive to deliver more than the minimum between his debt and the depreciated value of his collateral, i.e., we may have
The asset is thought as a pool, i.e., at each period t there is a delivery rate κ t ∈ [0, 1] that summarizes all different sellers' deliveries. By purchasing one unit of the asset, the lenders correctly anticipate to receive the fraction V t (κ, p) defined by
Along the paper we will use repeatedly the following notations. We let A be the space of sequences a = (a t ) t∈T with
For each period t, we denote by A t the set of plans a ∈ A such that a τ = (0, 0, 0, 0) for each τ > t. If a is a plan in A and t is a period, we denote by a1 [0,t] the plan in A t which coincides with a for every period τ ∈ {0, . . . , t}. We denote by B t the set of plans a in A t satisfying ϕ t = 0.
Budget constraints
In each decision period t ∈ T , agent i's choice
(a) solvency constraint:
The payoff function
Assume that π = (p, q, κ) is a sequence of prices and delivery rates. Consider that agent i has chosen the plan a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) ∈ A. He gets the utility
but he suffers the disutility
6 One of the equilibrium conditions will require that lenders' expected return Vt(κ, p) coincides with the actual deliveries of the borrowers in the sense that i∈I Vt(κ, p)θ
7 By convention we let a −1 = (x −1 , θ −1 , ϕ −1 , d −1 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
We would like to define the payoff Π i (p, a) of the plan a as U i (x) − W i (p, a). Unfortunately, this difference may not be well-defined if both U i (x) and W i (p, a) are infinite.
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We propose to consider the binary relation i,p defined on A by
and
The set Pref i (p, a) of plans strictly preferred to plan a by agent i is defined by
The equilibrium concept
We denote by Ξ the set of sequences of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ) satisfying for all t ∈ T
Given a sequence (p, q, κ) of commodity prices, asset prices and delivery rates, we denote by B i (p, q, κ) the set of plans a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) ∈ A satisfying constraints (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is a family of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and an allocation a = (a i ) i∈I with a i ∈ A such that (a) for every agent i, the plan a i is optimal among the budget feasible plans, i.e., 
The set of allocations a = (a i ) i∈I in A satisfying the market clearing conditions (2.6) and (2.7) is denoted by F. Each allocation in F is called physically feasible. A plan a i ∈ A is called physically feasible if there exists a physically feasible allocation b ∈ F such that a i = b i .
Assumptions
For each agent i, we denote by Ω i = (Ω i t ) t∈T the sequence of accumulated endowments, defined recursively by
of accumulated aggregate endowments is denoted by Ω. This section describes the assumptions imposed on the characteristics of the economy. It should be clear that these assumptions always hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1 (Agents). For every agent i, (A.1) the sequence of accumulated endowments is strictly positive and uniformly bounded from above, i.e.,
(A.2) for every period t, the utility function v 
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Assumption 2.2 (Financial asset). For every period t, the collateral bundle C t is not zero.
Remark 2.1. Let (π, a) be a competitive equilibrium with π = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ. Since x i is physically feasible, we have 0 x i t Ω t . Following Assumption (A.2) and (A.3) we have ∞) . Each agent can choose to survive in autarky, i.e., the plan aut i = (Ω i , 0, 0, 0) belongs to the budget set B i (π). This implies that we cannot have aut
This implies that Π
i (p, a i ) belongs to [−∞,i i,p a i . Since W i (p, aut i ) = 0, we must have W i (p, a i ) > −∞, implying that the payoff Π i (p, a i ) belongs to R.
Indeterminacy of delivery rates and overpessimistic expectations
Let (π, (a i ) i∈I ) be a competitive equilibrium with π = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and
. Fix a period t 1. Since agent i delivers in period t at least the amount D t (p)ϕ i t−1 , we let σ i t ∈ [0, 1] be the individual delivery rate defined by the equation
if agent i has a debt ϕ and κ t can be interpreted as the average delivery rate (per unit of asset sold) above the minimum delivery D t (p). If there is no trade in period t − 1 then the delivery rate κ t is undeterminate. That is, when the asset is not traded, our equilibrium concept makes no assumption about the expected delivery rate. We claim that pessimistic expectations about delivery (i.e., low values of κ t ) may by itself render the asset market inactive in period t − 1 if default penalties are large enough. Our finding shares some similarities with the issue of trivial equilibria pointed out by Dubey et al. (2005) . To clarify this link we recall some notations. In Dubey et al. (2005) assets are not collateralized. The repayment rate, denoted by K t , is defined by the equation
As explained in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) (see Remark 3.1), when assets are collateralized agents deliver at least D t (p) per unit of asset sold. In this case, if D t (p) and V t (p) are not zero, rational agents expect K t to be greater than the ratio D t (p)/V t (p), and in particular it must be non-null.
11 This is the reason why in our model we have chosen to parameterize agents' expectations about delivery by the average delivery rate above the minimum delivery, denoted by κ t . In other words, when there is trade in period t − 1 we have the relation
In Dubey et al. (2005) it is easy to support equilibria with no trade in the asset on account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. However, in a model with collateral requirements, it is not clear whether such equilibria can be supported.
12 The first contribution of this paper is to show that although agents expect
11 If the promise bundle At and the depreciated collateral bundle YtC t−1 are not zero then Dt(p) (and consequently Vt(p)) are not zero since pt is strictly positive.
12 The intuition behind the existence of trivial equilibria in Dubey et al. (2005) is as follows. Consider a sequence of pure spot markets and an associated equilibrium. Introduce next an asset in period t. Choose the repayment rate K t+1 of the asset equal to zero and the price qt equal to zero. Then no agent would have an incentive to trade. In a model with collateralized obligations this argument breaks down since K t+1 must be larger that D t+1 (p)/V t+1 (p). In case the asset's promise is larger than the per unit repayments K t to be strictly positive (actually above or equal to the minimum D t (p)/V t (p)) there is still room for unduly pessimistic expectations that sustain equilibrium with no trade. To illustrate our point we consider the two examples presented by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) and show that when default penalties are harsh enough no trade is a possible equilibrium outcome. A direct implication of our finding is that in those examples harsh default penalties do not always lead to Ponzi schemes as it is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) .
The primitives
We propose to consider a specific economy with one good per period, one asset and time independent primitives:
• The collateral is C > 0, the depreciation factor is Y ∈ (0, 1), the promise is A with A = b + Y C and b > 0, and the reference bundle w t is constant equal to 1.
• Agents have the same instantaneous utility function v : x → x.
• Agents may differ in their endowments ω i t > 0, discount factor β i ∈ (0, 1) and unitary default penalty µ i .
• We choose the family (β i ) i∈I such that the following inequality holds true
where β = min i∈I β i and β = max i∈I β i .
Remark 3.1. It is always possible to find a family (β i ) i∈I satisfying (3.1) since A > Y C and Y < 1. In particular, one may consider an economy with a single agent. In that case, the above inequality is satisfied for any discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 3.1. For every depreciation factor Y small enough and every family (µ i ) i∈I of default penalties satisfying
the no trade allocation (Ω i , 0, 0, 0) i∈I is a competitive equilibrium under the price system π = (p t , q t , κ t ) t∈T defined by 13 ∀t ∈ T , p t = 1, κ t = 0 and q t = q where q can be suitably chosen to satisfy βY C < q < min{C, βA}.
(3.3) depreciated value of the collateral, i.e., D t+1 (p) = p t+1 Y t+1 Ct, one may try to implement no trade by choosing κ t+1 = 0 (or equivalently
) and fixing the asset price qt = ptCt. No agent would have incentives to invest. Indeed, it would be better to buy the bundle Ct instead of one unit of the asset because of the utility obtained from consuming the collateral. However, it is not clear whether agents would have no incentives to sell the asset. It depends on whether the gain from consuming the collateral in period t can compensate the future penalty suffered in case of default or the loss in consumption due to the repayment of debt besides the value of the depreciated collateral.
13 Observe that κt = 0 corresponds to Kt = Dt(p)/Vt(p) > 0 in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . That is, under this price system, no trade is a non-trivial equilibrium according to Definition 3.3 in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). This example illustrates that even if default penalties are harsh and lenders' expect asset deliveries to be strictly positive, pessimistic expectations destroy incentives to trade and no trade can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. The intuition is as follows. Since q > β i Y C the asset is too expensive to provide incentives to invest. Indeed, lenders have pessimistic expectations and believe that the unitary payment of the asset will be Y C (which corresponds to the minimum delivery associated to the seizure of collateral). The discounted value β i Y C of the delivery does not compensate the cost q. Since q < β i A, the asset price is too low to provide incentives to short-sell. Indeed, when short-selling one unit of the asset, the borrower knows he will be punished if does not deliver A. The price of the asset does not compensate this loss. These two conditions ensure that the no trade plan (Ω i , 0, 0, 0) is optimal among finite horizon allocations. The fact that q < C will enable us to prove that any budget feasible plan satisfies a transversality condition, which ensures the optimality of the no trade plan among all budget feasible plans.
Remark 3.2. The economy described above satisfies all the conditions of the two (classes of) examples of non-existence proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . In their first example, the unitary default penalty µ i is chosen to be large enough, in particular it can be taken to satisfy (3.2). In the second example, µ i is assumed to satisfy
for some f i > 1. Observe that such default penalties satisfy condition (3.2) in Proposition 3.1.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is split in two steps. We first show that first order conditions are satisfied for some well-chosen Lagrange multipliers. Then we prove that a kind of transversality condition is also satisfied.
First order conditions
We propose to show that the first order conditions are satisfied. 14 For any agent i we should find a sequence (δ 
14 We recall the definition of the super-differential of a concave function. Consider a finite set K, a convex subset X of R K and a concave function f :
The vectors in ∂f (x) are called super-gradients of f at x. The function f is said super-differentiable on X if the super-differential ∂f (x) is non-empty at every point x ∈ X.
(b) first order condition for asset purchases:
(c) first order condition for deliveries:
(d) first order condition for asset sales:
(e) binding restrictions at the plan (
We propose to make the following choices.
• Since ϕ • We pose ρ
We then get the first order conditions for deliveries.
• We choose δ i such that 1 = µ
Since µ i is assumed to be larger than 1/(1 − β i Y ), we get that δ i belongs to [0, 1] . It follows that first order conditions for consumption are satisfied.
• We let α
and get the first order condition for asset purchases.
and then get the first order condition for asset sales.
Transversality condition
Since θ i t = 0 for every t, first order conditions ensure optimality among budget feasible plans with a finite horizon.
16 To prove that we have a competitive equilibrium, we should show that any (infinite horizon) budget feasible plan a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) satisfies a kind of transversality condition. Since the collateral cost C is larger than the asset price q we can apply the proposition in Appendix A to get that any plan a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) in the budget set with finite utility U i (x) cannot be strictly preferred to the no trade plan. Now we propose to conclude by showing that any plan a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) in the budget set B i (π) has a finite utility. Actually, we will prove that the sequence (x t ) t∈T is uniformly bounded from above. To see this, we let x t = x t − C t ϕ t 0. From the budget constraint at t = 0, we have
At t = 1, we have
Observe that
We have thus proved that
where
Actually we can prove recursively that
Recall that we propose to choose q satisfying (3.3), i.e., βY C < q < min{C, βA}.
Fix Γ > 1/β and choose q = q(Y ) = ΓβY C.
Since β < 1 we have Γ > 1 and we automatically get βY C < q(Y ). Choosing Y small enough we get the other inequality q(Y ) < min{C, βA}.
Given the choice of q we have
Choosing Y small enough, we get that ℵ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore if a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) belongs to the budget set B i (π) then the consumption process is uniformly bounded from above. More precisely we have
Refined equilibrium
In the previous section we showed that the standard equilibrium concept introduced by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) is not satisfactory since unreasonable pessimism may render the asset market inactive. The problem comes from equation (2.8) that leaves undeterminate agents' expectations about the delivery rate κ t when there is no trade at equilibrium. It is thus important to refine the equilibrium concept in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets.
To address this issue, we follow Dubey et al. (2005) and introduce an equilibrium refinement in which the government intervenes to sell infinitesimal quantities ε > 0 of the asset at each period and fully delivers on its promises. Since the government does not default, it does not need to constitute collateral bundles. However, since it delivers fully εV t (p) but it gets delivered only εV t (κ, p), on net the government injects the vector of commodities εb t (κ, p)w t where b t (κ, p) 0 is defined by the equation
This touch of honesty banishes whimsical pessimism and rules out spurious inactivity on asset markets. We adapt the definition of a competitive equilibrium with the government intervention proposed by Dubey et al. (2005) to our framework.
Definition 4.1. An ε-equilibrium is a family π = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ of prices and delivery rates and an allocation (a i ) i∈I such that
• as in the standard competitive equilibrium, for every agent i the plan a i is optimal among the budget feasible plans and the asset market clears at every period,
• different to the standard competitive equilibrium, commodity markets ε-clear, i.e.,
and delivery rates are boosted by the external agent, i.e.,
Equation (4.2) defining the delivery rate κ t can be restated as follows
where σ i t is agent i's individual delivery rate as defined in Section 3. The delivery rate κ t is the weighted average of individual rates and is boosted due to the fact that the government delivers fully on its promises. As the government intervention disappears, i.e., ε tends to 0, this boost disappears for periods where the asset is positively traded in the limit.
17 By convention we let a −1 = (x −1 , θ −1 , ϕ −1 , d −1 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and b 0 (κ, p) = 0. Definition 4.2. A competitive equilibrium (π, (a i ) i∈I ) is called a refined equilibrium if for every ε > 0 small enough there exists an ε-equilibrium (π(ε), (a i (ε)) i∈I ) such that
It is now natural to investigate under which conditions a refined equilibrium exists. To answer this question we should find first conditions under which an ε-equilibrium exists. It is straightforward to adapt the arguments in Araujo et al. (2002) , Dubey et al. (2005) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) to get existence (under standard assumptions) of an ε-equilibrium for economies with a finite horizon. One may then consider a sequence of finite-horizon ε-equilibria (π T , (a i,T ) i∈I ) T ∈T where the horizon T tends to infinite. Following the arguments in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) it is straightforward to prove that there exists a subsequence converging to some (π, (a i ) i∈I ). In order to prove that the limit (π, (a i ) i∈I ) is an ε-equilibrium, the only difficulty is to show that the plan a i is optimal in the budget set defined by the price sequence π.
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) claimed that a sufficient condition for optimality of the limiting plan a i (and consequently for existence of an equilibrium) is to assume that default penalties are moderate, in the sense that, for infinitely many periods, the penalty associated with the maximal default for a physically feasible plan is less than the utility from consuming the current endowment.
18 This statement appears to be very intuitive: if default penalties are moderate then default does not hurt much and nothing prevent agents to fully default in the long run. Ponzi schemes should be avoided, since, after a while, the joint operation of short-selling an asset and purchasing the collateral bundle should not allow to transfer wealth between periods. In the following section we show that although intuitive, the condition proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) is not sufficient to ensure existence. 
Moderate default penalties and Ponzi schemes
To illustrate that moderate default penalties are not always compatible with the existence of an ε-equilibrium, we present a specific example of an economy where default penalties are moderate but severe enough to induce all agents to never default on their promises. It is then possible to specify asset promises and utility functions such that if an ε-equilibrium does exist then equilibrium prices are such that agents can run Ponzi schemes, leading to a contradiction. 18 Páscoa and Seghir (2009) assumed that default penalties are moderate and claimed in Theorem 4.1 that an equilibrium exists. Actually, the only difficult step (which is also the only step where the assumption of moderate penalties is used) of their proof consists of proving that if a sequence of finite horizon equilibria converges then for every agent, the limiting plan is optimal for the infinite horizon budget set. If their arguments were correct we would also get existence of an ε-equilibrium when default penalties are moderate since optimality of a plan among budget feasible plans is independent of whether we consider equilibria or ε-equilibria (individual demand sets coincide for both concepts).
19 The mistake in the intuitive argument we provide (and in the proof proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) ) is that when contemplating an alternative budget feasible plan, an agent does not restrict his choices to be physically feasible. In particular, depending on the sequence of prices, a budget feasible plan may have a sequence of asset short-sales that is inconsistent with the scarcity of goods (recall that that when short-selling an agent should constitute collateral in terms of goods).
Moderate default penalties
Fix some ε > 0. We start by introducing some notation and making additional assumptions. We assume that there exists b 0 such that for every period t 1 we have A t bw t + Y t C t−1 . This implies that the maximal default b t per unit of asset is bounded from above by b, i.e.,
We denote by W = (W t ) t 1 the sequence defined recursively by W t = w t +Y t W t−1 where W 1 = w 1 . We assume that there exists an upper bound W of the sequence W . For each period t, we denote by M t the real number
where Ω ε t is an upper bound on aggregate resources at period t defined recursively by
where ω t = i∈I ω i t . We let Ω ε be the uniform upper bound on aggregate resources defined by Ω ε ≡ Ω + εbW .
Observe that under Assumption 2.2, we have M t < ∞. Finally, for every period t 1 we let
The quantity H t is an upper bound of the amount in real terms that an agent may default if his plan is feasible in the ε-economy. The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and omitted.
Proposition 5.1. If a in A is a plan physically feasible in the ε-economy and (p, q, κ) in Ξ is a sequence of prices and delivery rates, then for each period t, we have
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) introduced the concept of α-moderate default penalties that is adapted here to ε-economies. Fix a sequence α = (α t ) t∈T with α t ∈ (1, ∞).
Definition 5.1. Default penalties are said α-moderate with respect to utility functions, if for every agent i there exists an infinite subset Mod i of T such that
Default penalties are said moderate with respect to utility functions, if they are α-moderate for some α ∈ (1, ∞)
T .
In other words, when default penalties are α-moderate, then for infinitely many periods the penalty associated with the maximal default for a feasible plan, is less than the utility from consuming the current endowment.
Observe that the term bt(κ, p) appearing in the market clearing condition (4.1) satisfies bt(κ, p) bt.
Lagrange multipliers when default penalties are moderate
Throughout this subsection we fix an economy E with moderate default penalties and provide necessary conditions (in particular first order conditions) for the existence of an ε-equilibrium. Our conditions rely on a technical existence result of Lagrange multipliers that is presented in a supplementary material. While standard, the arguments are delicate. For instance, the fact that default penalties are moderate plays a crucial role.
22 It is not clear to us whether the first order conditions that we provide are still valid if default penalties are not moderate.
Assume that (π, a) is an ε-equilibrium where π ∈ Ξ is a sequence π = (π t ) t∈T of prices and delivery rates with π t = (p t , q t , κ t ) and a = (a i ) i∈I is an allocation of plans
. Applying Theorem 1.1 in the supplementary material we can prove that for each agent i there exist,
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• a sequence of non-negative Lagrange multipliers (γ i t ) t∈T corresponding to the sequence of budget constraints (2.1);
• for each commodity , a sequence (χ i t ( )) t∈T of non-negative Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the sequence of collateral requirements (2.2);
• a sequence of non-negative Lagrange multipliers (ρ i t ) t∈T corresponding to the sequence of minimum delivery constraints (2.3);
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• two sequences of non-negative Lagrange multipliers (α i θ,t ) t∈T and (α i ϕ,t ) t∈T corresponding to the non-negative constraints on portfolio purchases and sales such that for any period τ 1 and each finite sequence a = (a t ) t∈T 
where A is the set of sequences (a t ) t∈T with a t = (x t , θ t , ϕ t , d t ) satisfying 25 x t ∈ R L , θ t ∈ R, ϕ t ∈ R and d t ∈ R and A τ the set of sequences (a t ) t∈T ∈ A with horizon τ , i.e., a t = 0 for each period t > τ . The Lagrangian L i t (a t , a t−1 ) is defined by
The fact that default penalties are moderate is used in Claim 5.1 which is essential in order to get condition (d) in Theorem 1.1 of the supplementary material.
23 One should apply Theorem 1.1 in the supplementary material by choosing Lt = L ∪ {1, 2, 3} or equivalently R L t = R L × R 3 . Condition (L.3) in the supplementary material follows from (A.1) and (A.2). Condition (b) in Theorem 1.1 of the supplementary material follows from Remark 2.1. 24 We let ρ i 0 = 0 since there is no delivery at the initial period t = 0. 25 By convention, we let a −1 = (0, 0, 0, 0).
Because of the minimum delivery constraint we do not need to restrict the delivery to be non-negative, and because of the collateral requirement constraint we do not need to restrict the consumption plan to be non-negative. This is the reason why there are no Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the non-negative constraints on consumption bundles and deliveries.
Since default penalties are moderate, the ε-equilibrium (π, a) should satisfy the following property.
Claim 5.1. For every agent i and any period t 1, there exist τ t and a budget feasible (τ + 1)-period sequenceǎ
Proof. Fix an agent i and a period t 1. Since Mod i is infinite, there exists T ∈ Mod i satisfying T > t. We pose τ = T − 1. It is straightforward to check that we can choosě a i defined as follows
In other words, when choosing the planǎ i , agent i decides to fully default on his debt at period T = τ + 1 and consume his initial endowment. Because τ + 1 belongs to Mod i , the utility from consuming his endowment compensates the disutility from defaulting and we get (5.3). Now, we can apply Claim 5.1 to show that condition (d) of Theorem 1.1 in the supplementary material is satisfied. Therefore, for any period t ∈ T and every commodity , we have γ
In particular, we can deduce that there exist for each agent i, • a family of super-gradients (∇v • a family of super-gradients (δ
such that (a) first order condition for consumption:
Based on the above necessary conditions, we will prove two results. First, we will show that, for any sequence of collateral bundles and utility functions (among a certain class), we can choose asset promises and moderate default penalties such that default is incompatible with equilibrium. Second, given the asset promises and moderate default penalties suitably chosen, we will show that we can choose a specific sequence of collateral bundles and utility functions such that the full repayment of debt in a non-trivial equilibrium implies that the asset price q t is strictly larger than the cost p t C t of constituting the collateral requirement. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) already explained that this condition induce agents to run Ponzi schemes and is not consistent with optimality of plans in an ε-equilibrium.
In order to understand why moderate default penalties may induce agents to fully repay their debt, we need to present the following important intermediary step.
Proposition 5.2. For every agent i and every period τ ∈ Mod i , the "discounted" market
Proof. Fix an agent i and a period τ ∈ Mod i . Let a in A be defined by
In other words, choosing the plan a, agent i is following the optimal plan a i up to period τ , defaulting fully on his debt at period τ and consuming his initial endowment. Since the plan a belongs to A τ , we can apply (5.4) to get
Since default penalties are moderate at period τ , i.e., τ ∈ Mod i , we have µ
Remark 5.2. We obtain a bound on the marginal utility of wealth at period τ + 1 when τ belongs to Mod i , i.e., when default penalties are moderate. If default penalties are not moderate we do not know if it is possible to exhibit a similar bound.
Moderate default penalties precluding default
We are now ready to show that moderate default penalties may induce agents to optimally decide to make full payments. In order to clarify the presentation, we assume from now on that the economy satisfies the following list of additional assumptions. Observe that Assumption (A.2) implies that v i is concave, continuous, strictly increasing with v i (0) = 0. Moreover, under Assumptions (A.5) and (A.6) we have b t = b t and the maximum amount H t in real terms that an agent may default if his plan is feasible, satisfies H t = M t−1 b t . Since (b t ) t 1 is uniformly bounded, we can let b be the least upper bound sup t 1 b t .
We claim that we can choose default penalties such that they are moderate but at the same time severe enough to preclude default at equilibrium. To find such default penalties we make use of the bound obtained in Proposition 5.2.
28 Our aim is to show that restricting default penalties to be moderate does not prevent us to choose them severe enough to preclude default at equilibrium. The intuition is very simple. Default penalties are moderate if the disutility µ i t H t felt at period t for defaulting the amount H t is compensated by the utility v Under the simplifying assumptions made above, we have H t = M t−1 b t . We can always choose the promise A t close enough to the depreciated collateral Y t C t−1 (by choosing b t close enough to 0) such that H t is as small as desired. This implies that given any sequence of default penalties, we can always choose the sequence of promises such that penalties are moderate. Then, as shown below, we can use Proposition 5.2 to find default penalties µ i t severe enough to preclude default. Proposition 5.3. Fix α > 1 and choose default penalties as follows
and the promises' coefficients b t as follows
Default penalties are α-moderate, more precisely, for every agent i we have Mod i = T . Moreover, if there is a competitive equilibrium for E then every agent pays his debt at any period t 1.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that Mod i = T for every agent i. Indeed, under Assumptions (A.5) and (A.6) we have
It follows that ∀i ∈ I, ∀t 1, αµ
We propose now to prove that if (π, a) is a competitive equilibrium then every agent pays his debt at any period. Fix t 1 and assume by way of contradiction that agent i is not paying his debt at date t. The super-gradient δ i t associated to the default penalty must then satisfy δ i t = 1. From the first order condition for deliveries (5.7) we get
(5.10)
Combining Proposition 5.2 and (5.10) we get the following contradiction
Moderate default penalties leading to Ponzi schemes
Given the choices of promises and default penalties made in Proposition 5.3, if (π, a) is an ε-equilibrium then every agent fully repays his debt at every period. Since the government always pays his debt, we get that κ t = 1 for every period t. 29 We would like to compare the asset price q t and the cost p t C t of constituting the collateral bundle. When a lender wants to transfer wealth from period t to period t + 1, two strategies are available. The first one consists on purchasing the asset in period t: the lender accepts to pay q t in exchange of the future wealth p t+1 A t+1 . As a second strategy, the lender may prefer to purchase the collateral C t , paying p t C t , in exchange of the future wealth p t+1 Y t+1 C t . Following the second strategy, the lender will also enjoy utility from consuming the collateral bundle in period t.
Our aim is to show that we can choose the collateral bundle C t and the utility function v i such that the "margin" utility from consuming the collateral bundle in period t does not compensate the margin consumption corresponding to the difference p t+1 b t+1 = p t+1 [A t+1 −Y t+1 C t ] of the payoffs associated to the above strategies. As a consequence we will have q t > p t C t for every period t which is inconsistent with optimality of individual plans.
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Theorem 5.1. Choose default penalties and promises coefficients as in Proposition 5.3 (implying that default penalties are moderate). Moreover, assume that
• there are two goods, L = { , g};
• for every t, the collateral bundle C t is only in terms of good g, more precisely,
• the utility function v i is separable in goods, i.e., there exist two functions v i and v i g defined on [0, ∞), concave, differentiable, strictly increasing with
29 If we do not consider an ε-equilibrium, then one may have κt < 1 and no trade in period t. In that case, our argument would not apply. 30 In that respect, we show that the arguments in (Páscoa and Seghir, 2009, Theorem 4 .1) are not correct.
Let ω = (1/#I)ω and choose the functions v i and v i g satisfying
Then Ponzi schemes are not ruled out, i.e., an ε-equilibrium cannot exist, despite default penalties being moderate.
Remark 5.3. It is straightforward to provide examples of utility functions satisfying (5.11). Indeed, fix any pair of functions
Observe that c∇v
Passing to the limit, we get lim ξ→0 c∇v i,ξ g ( ω(g)) = 0 and lim
It follows that there exists ξ > 0 small enough such that
We have thus exhibited a non-empty class of utility functions satisfying (5.11).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists an ε-equilibrium (π, a) with π = (p, q, κ). Following Proposition 5.3, every agent i pays his debt at every period t 1. Since the government always pays his debt, this implies that κ t = 1 for every period t. It follows that (p, q, a) is also a competitive equilibrium of the economy E with perfect commitment (the government plays no role in E since it does not to inject goods, i.e., b t (κ, p) = 0.) in the sense that each agent i maximizes the utility U i (x) among the actions (x, θ, ϕ) satisfying, for each period t 0, the following budget constraint
As usual ∇v i (x) = (∇v i (x( )), ∇v i g (x(g))) is the gradient of v i at x where ∇v i and ∇v i g are the differential of v i and v i g respectively. 32 Observe that if we replace ωt by ω in the definition of bt given in Proposition 5.3 then we get b. In particular we have bt b for every t 1.
together with the collateral requirement constraint
(5.13)
We propose to prove that for every period t we have q t > p t C t . Assume by way of contradiction that there exists t ∈ T such that q t p t C t . Since markets clear, we have i∈I
implying that there exists at least one agent i such that
Given ν > 0, we consider the alternative choice ( x ν , θ ν , ϕ ν ) which coincides with the action (x i , θ i , ϕ i ) except for consumption vectors at periods t and t+1 and asset purchases at period t. More precisely, we pose
where ν > 0 is chosen small enough to ensure x ν t 0. The alternative action ( x ν , θ ν , ϕ ν ) consists on reducing the consumption of good g by νc units. The gain in purchasing power is νp t C t . Since the price q t of the asset is lower than p t C t , agent i can purchase ν units of the asset, implying that the budget restriction (5.12) is satisfied at date t. Consuming x ν t at period t instead of x i t implies a loss of νp t+1 Y t+1 C t units of account in period t + 1. This loss is more than compensated by the extra return νp t+1 A t+1 = νb t+1 p t+1 ω + νp t+1 Y t+1 C t associated to the alternative portfolio θ ν . Actually, the extra wealth νb t+1 p t+1 ω can be used to purchase at period t + 1 the νb t+1 additional units of the bundle ω. We have thus proved that the budget restriction (5.12) is also satisfied at date t. Therefore the alternative action ( x ν , θ ν , ϕ ν ) belongs to the budget set of the perfect commitment economy E . In particular, we must have U i (x i ) U i ( x ν ). However, we have 
It follows from (5.11) that there exists ν > 0 small enough such that we obtain the contradiction U i (x i ) − U i ( x ν ) < 0.
Concluding remarks
The paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) concerning the existence and non-existence of Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties. We first show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . Choosing appropriately the primitives in those two examples, it is possible to support no trade equilibrium due to irrationally pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. In addition, we show that when unduly pessimistic expectations are ruled out, equilibria fail to exist even if default penalties are moderate. More precisely, we provide a specific example showing that moderate default penalties can be severe enough to induce agents to pay fully their debt at every period. This fact can induce agents to run a Ponzi scheme destroying equilibrium existence.
We believe that these findings raise fruitful questions for future research. First, they clarify that there is room for unduly pessimistic expectations that sustain equilibrium with no trade in collateralized economies with default penalties. It will be interesting to know under which general conditions such equilibria can always be supported. In the absence of collateral requirements (see Dubey et al. (2005) ) nothing prevents the existence of no trade equilibria on account of overpessimistic expectations. However, as explained in Section 3, in collateralized economies it is not clear whether one can provide a straightforward answer. Second, it will be interesting to study if there exists a (non-trivial) condition relating default penalties to primitives under which agents are not induced to run Ponzi schemes, and existence of a refined equilibrium in collateralized economies is guaranteed. In Appendix B we provide an affirmative answer to this question by exhibiting a sufficient condition on default penalties (expressed in terms of the primitives of the economy) that precludes Ponzi schemes: the marginal utility of consuming the collateral should be eventually larger than the marginal default penalty. The sufficient condition is in sharp contrast with the one proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) . Their definition of moderate default penalties involves the comparison of utility and disutility levels (disutilty from defaulting and utility of consuming the initial endowment), while our characterization of the family of default penalties involves the comparison of marginal utility and disutility.
Appendix A. A kind of transversality condition
In this appendix we consider a price sequence π = (p, q, κ) in Ξ and a generic agent (we omit the index i) with a plan a = (x , θ , ϕ , d ) in the budget set B(π) that is optimal among all budget feasible plans having a finite horizon.
We propose to show that if Ponzi schemes are impossible then the plan a is also optimal among all budget feasible plans a = (x, θ, ϕ, d) having a finite utility U (x). To see this we introduce the following notation.
Definition. Given the price sequence π = (p, q, κ) in Ξ, a period t is said to be a barrier to Ponzi schemes if the asset price does not exceed the collateral cost, i.e., q t p t C t . The set of barriers is denoted by Barr(p, q).
Recall that Ponzi schemes are possible if and only if the set Barr(p, q) is finite. also at date t + 1. Indeed, agent i may decide to pay back D t+1 (p)ε which is smaller
